[編譯] 經濟學人 波灣國家與卡達和解露曙光
編按：此文作於2019/12/18日
文中的Qassem Suleimani就是今天被美國炸死的那位。
https://tinyurl.com/vhbl5yo
https://imgur.com/s6JGH9P
Walking onto a football pitch hardly seems an act of high diplomacy.
But two and a half years into the embargo of Qatar by three Gulf neighbours—
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (uae)—it may count as
progress. The three had planned to boycott the annual Gulf Cup because it was
being held in Doha, the capital of Qatar. In November, though, they changed
their minds, and on December 2nd the Emiratis took the field against the
Qataris. The Emiratis lost 4-2. Adding insult to injury, the defeat came on
their national day, which marks the unification of several emirates into the
uae. Still, the match ended amicably enough, a far cry from an Asian Cup tilt
in January, when the victorious Qatari squad was pelted with shoes and
bottles by the crowd in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the uae.
一般而言打了場足球賽似乎難以與外交政策能有甚麼連結，但考量到卡達已經與他的三個
波灣鄰國─巴林、沙烏地阿拉伯、阿拉伯聯合大公國這兩年半的外交封鎖關係，這也算是
一種進步。這三國打算杯葛一年一度的海灣盃(Gulf Cup)，因為今年將在卡達首都杜哈
(Doha)舉辦，然而到了11月，他們改變決定，但在12月2日阿聯酋隊對卡達隊的球賽中，
阿聯酋隊以4比2輸給卡達隊，更慘的是，那天還是象徵阿聯酋長國統一的阿聯酋的國慶日
，儘管如此，比賽還算和平落幕，跟今年1月的在阿聯酋首度阿布達比(Abu Dhabi)舉辦的
亞足聯亞洲盃(Asian Cup)相比了話，那一場比賽卡達隊也是贏家，但是被觀眾砸鞋與酒
瓶。
The embargo, imposed in June 2017, has divided families, diverted planes and
caused a deep rift in the six-member Gulf Co-operation Council (gcc). Qatar
refuses to comply with a list of demands from the Saudi-led camp, such as
cutting ties with Islamist groups and closing Al Jazeera, a satellite news
channel. But there are growing signs that some of the blockading states want
to end the feud anyway. Apart from the football diplomacy, Saudi Arabia and
Qatar have held quiet talks about a resolution. On December 10th Qatar’s
prime minister flew to Saudi Arabia for a gcc summit, the emirate’s
highest-level representation in two years. No one expected it to produce a
deal, but Qatar’s foreign minister said it broke a long “stalemate”.
這場始於2017年的禁運風波，已經導致了無數家庭被拆散、航線重劃，使卡達與海合會
(GCC)其他5個國家產生嚴重分歧。卡達拒絕向沙國所領導的陣營對其所提出的一系列要求
妥協，諸如拒絕支持特定伊斯蘭組織，關閉半島電視台。目前已有雙方僵局出現和緩的跡
象，12月10日，卡達的總理飛去沙國參加海合會峰會，這是自2017禁運後最高職位的卡達
代表，這次會面外界預期不會達成任何協議，但卡達的外交部長宣稱已經打破了長久以來
的僵局了。
To understand why, look across the Gulf to another intractable conflict, the
one between Iran and its Arab neighbours. Their long cold war has escalated
into overt hostilities. President Donald Trump’s economic sanctions, meant
to bludgeon Iran into softening its regional policies, have instead made it
more belligerent. The feud with Qatar seems more and more a needless
distraction, one that has forced the Qataris to deepen their political and
economic ties with Iran. There is no newfound love between Qatar and its Gulf
neighbours, but there is a newfound realism.
要了解來龍去脈，先了解另一個波灣區不可避免的衝突來源，也就是伊朗與其他阿拉伯國
家之間的衝突。雙方長久的嫌隙已經檯面化。川普對伊朗的經濟制裁，意在打擊伊朗並軟
化其在中東區域政策的強硬立場；但事與願違，伊朗反而轉趨強硬，這讓其他波灣阿拉伯
國家與卡達的嫌隙顯得越來越不必要，因為這可能導致卡達與伊朗的政經關係更緊密，因
此可以說卡達其他波灣阿拉伯國家的關係和緩並不是基於情感上的理由，而是基於新的政
治現實。
A turning-point came on September 14th, when missiles rained down on two oil
facilities in Saudi Arabia’s eastern desert. Half of the country’s oil
output—5% of the world’s total—was briefly knocked offline. America and
Saudi Arabia saw Iran’s hand behind the attack (though a United Nations
panel said in December that it found no definitive link). Yet it passed
without an overt American response.
事態的轉淚點發生在9月14日，位於沙國東部沙漠地區的兩座油廠遭到轟炸，造成沙國一
半─全世界5%的石油出產量將暫時停止供貨，美國與沙國認為此事是伊朗在幕後操控。(
雖然聯合國專案小組已在12月表示沒有明確證據)，不過美國沒有對此公開回應。
In public, Saudi officials insist they still trust their longtime friend. “
We don’t see this concept of America as receding. Quite the contrary,” says
Adel al-Jubeir, the minister of state for foreign affairs. America did deploy
an additional 3,000 troops to Saudi Arabia after the attack. Whether Mr Trump
would use them to defend the kingdom is another matter. Privately, Saudi
officials fret that the American security umbrella seems full of holes.
Worried that further attacks might spoil the initial public offering of Saudi
Aramco, the state oil giant, they began talking to Iran through
intermediaries this autumn. They are also trying to wind down a war in Yemen
against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels that has cost the kingdom dearly and
left Yemen even less stable than before.
在檯面上，沙國宣稱他們仍然相信他們的長期盟友，沙國外交部長Adel al-Jubeir表示：
「我們不認為與美國的關係退化，恰恰相反」，美國的確在攻擊之後向沙國增派3000名美
軍。然而，川普是否會用美軍來保衛沙國確是另一回是，私底下，由於沙國官員擔憂美國
的這個保護傘似乎充滿漏洞，若再受進一步的攻擊將有可能影響到沙國最大國營石油公司
Saudi Aramco的IPO，因此他們在秋天就透過中間人與伊朗聯繫。沙國也試圖結束在葉面
與伊朗支持的胡塞組織的作戰，這已經讓沙國付出巨大的代價，而且讓葉門變得很不穩定
。
If the Gulf states feel vulnerable, they believe Iran feels the same way. A
rise in fuel prices triggered a week of fierce nationwide protests in
November. Hundreds of people were killed in the ensuing crackdown, the
bloodiest unrest since the birth of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Abroad,
Iran looks overstretched. The protests sweeping across Iraq and Lebanon are
not, as hopeful American and Saudi officials insist, simply a revolt against
Iranian influence. Citizens of both countries have a long list of grievances.
But they have directed some of their anger at Iran’s closest regional
allies. Iraqi protesters want an end to Iran’s meddling in their politics.
Many Lebanese are bitterly disappointed in Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of
Hizbullah, the Iranian-backed militia and political party, who has smeared
protesters as foreign-funded agents.
若波灣阿拉伯國家感到不安了話，他們相信伊朗也沒好過到哪去，由於油價暴漲，伊朗在
11月爆發了激烈的全國性反政府示威，數以百境的人在隨後的鎮壓中喪命，這是自1979年
伊朗革命成立伊斯蘭共和國之後最大的血腥鎮壓。在國際上，伊朗似乎也處於窘境，伊拉
克與黎巴嫩也發生全國性的示威活動，而並非如同美國或者沙國官方宣稱的，示威僅是對
伊朗影響力的不滿。這兩國的人民有很多不滿，但他們把怒氣轉到伊朗最親近的盟友身上
，伊拉克示威者希望能消滅伊朗干預該國政治，黎巴嫩示威者則是伊朗支持的武裝組織、
該國政黨真主黨的領袖Hassan Nasrallah感到不滿，他將黎巴嫩的示威者抹黑成外國代理
人。
Sometimes it’s personal
有時候，是對人不對事
Talking is one thing; making deals is another. For a start, the Gulf states
are not a monolith. Saudi Arabia may be willing to forgive Qatar its
transgressions. The uae is less keen to: it views political Islamists (whom
Qatar supported for years) as a grave threat. The Emiratis insist there is no
daylight between them and the Saudis. Anwar Gargash, the minister of state
for foreign affairs, says any talk to the contrary is Qatari disinformation
meant to “split the ranks”. Again, though, officials take a different tone
in private. Diplomats also point to personal animus between the leaders of
Qatar and the uae.
和談是一回事，但要達成協議又是另一回事。首先，波斯灣的這些阿拉伯國家意見並非一
致，沙國可能不那麼在意卡達的所作所為，但阿聯就很在意了，它視那些卡達支持的特定
伊斯蘭勢力是一重大威脅，阿聯酋的外交部長Anwar Gargash宣稱，他們與沙國是心連心
的，任何與此相反的言論都是卡達在造謠，想要破壞他們的關係，不過在私底下，官員也
有不同的看法，外交們也指出這可能是卡達的領導與阿聯酋之間的私人恩怨。
Hopes for a deal with Iran are even more fanciful. Faced with dissent at
home, the Iranians are likely to see any concessions abroad as a show of
weakness. Qassem Suleimani, the architect of Iran’s regional policy, spent
weeks in Iraq this autumn helping to co-ordinate a ruthless crackdown on
protesters. Nor is Mr Trump likely to ease his “maximum pressure” campaign,
despite a prisoner swap between the two countries in December. “See, we can
make a deal together,” Mr Trump tweeted afterwards. Then his administration
imposed sanctions on Iran’s largest shipping company and airline.
與伊朗達成協議機會越來越渺茫，在面對國內的示威之下，伊朗可能會視任何在國際上的
讓步是一種軟弱的表現，伊朗重要的軍事家 Qassem Suleimani，也在秋天花了幾周去伊
拉克協助鎮壓示威。而川普也沒打算對伊朗態度放軟，即使在十二月伊朗與美國換囚，川
普還在他的推特上說：「看吧，我們也是可以和伊朗談的」，但沒過多久，川普的行政團
隊就對伊朗發出有史以來最大的海運、飛航禁令。
The next year or so could bring a change of leaders in America and, perhaps,
Saudi Arabia. The Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, will be a lame duck in
his final full year in power. Football matches and furtive messages are a
start. But it will probably take deeper political changes to break the Gulf’
s years-old impasses. ■
2020年之後，美國跟沙國的領導人皆有可能會換人，伊朗總統Hassan Rouhani由於任期快
屆滿，因此也是一個「跛腳鴨」( lame duck)。足球賽與檯面下的對話只是一個開始，若
要打破波灣地區長久以來的僵局，可能還需更進一步的政治變革。
This article appeared in the Middle East and Africa section of the print
edition under the headline "Making up is hard to do"
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